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Thomas N. Maloney
Degrees of Inequality
The Advance of Black Male Workers in the Northern 
Meat Packing and Steel Industries before World War II
Recent major works on long-term racial inequality in the labor market re­
volve around competing hypotheses concerning the importance of human 
capital factors (Smith and Welch 1989) and government policy (Donohue 
and Heckman 1991) in promoting black advance. There is, however, another 
line of thinking which emphasizes the importance of experimentation and 
“demand-side learning”: employers’ gaining access to accurate information 
about the abilities of black workers and adjusting their beliefs in accordance
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with this information. Gunnar Myrdal (1964 [1944]: 392-93) wrote of the 
significance of experimentation and demand-side learning for the progress 
of black workers half a century ago:
There is tremendous initial resistance to overcome when attempting to 
place even superior Negro labor in a plant where Negroes did not work 
formerly. Negro labor is often superior to the white man’s expectation, 
partly because the thinking in stereotypes makes him underestimate the 
individual Negro. . . . Employers who do employ Negroes, therefore, 
often get a higher appreciation of them than employers who do not. . . . 
There are tremendous elements of inertia which resist the introduction 
of Negro labor where there has previously been none. If they get in, 
however, they will have a better chance of staying.
The interaction of race, costly information, and “learning” has been ex­
plored extensively in the theoretical literature.1 However, this topic has not 
been the focus of much empirical work on racial inequality.2
The process of experimenting with and learning about black workers 
may have been an important determinant of labor market outcomes for these 
workers in the pre-World War II North. The hiring of black workers by 
a northern employer in the pre-World War II period was, in many cases, 
an experiment. Many northern employers simply had very little experience 
with black workers prior to this time. In particular, northern employers did 
not have experience with the sort of black worker who presented himself at 
their gates in the 1920s and 1930s: an agricultural worker recently arrived 
from the South. Experiments with these workers had to be conducted in 
the face of strongly pessimistic initial expectations arising from racial preju­
dice, but successful experience with black workers might cause an employer 
to modify his expectations and might make him more willing to use black 
workers in the future.
To identify the impact of this experimentation on black workers’ labor 
market outcomes, the approach taken in this paper is to focus on inter­
industry variation in racial inequality in the pre-World War II North, be­
cause the cost of conducting the experiment Myrdal describes varied across 
industries as labor market structure varied across industries. Elements of 
internal labor market structure—the use of job ladders and internal pro­
motion—directly increased the cost of experimenting with black workers as
they entered northern labor markets. In addition, the low turnover rates and 
stable internal work force which characterize structured internal labor mar­
kets increased the potential impact of racial prejudice on the part of white 
workers and so prevented black workers from gaining access to new posi­
tions. For these reasons, variation in costs of experimentation, arising from 
variation in internal labor markets, may have allowed black workers access to 
new jobs in some industries even while they remained confined to unskilled 
laborer positions in other industries.
Because the concepts of “internal labor market structure” and “costs of 
experimentation” are not easily quantified, I conduct this investigation as a 
comparison of the progress of black workers in two industries: the meat pack­
ing industry and the steel industry. This approach facilitates examination of 
qualitative historical evidence relating to labor market structure. These two 
industries are chosen in part because they were important employers of Afri­
can American men in the North during this period. In addition, they exhibit 
strongly contrasting patterns of black progress: more rapid access to better 
occupations and better relative wages in the meat packing industry than in 
the steel industry.
Because this analysis proceeds as a comparison of two cases, it cannot 
establish the generalizability of the model presented here. Further, the analy­
sis deals with male workers only. In part, this restriction is necessitated by 
the small number of women, particularly the small number of black women, 
working in these industries in 1940.3 In part, it reflects the fact that race may 
matter differently for men and women in the labor market.4 Even with these 
limitations, the results indicate that internal labor market structure may well 
have affected the progress of black male workers in these two industries in 
the North in the pre-World War II period.
Black Progress in Northern Steel and Meat 
Packing before World War II
Black workers entered the northern meat packing and steel industries, often 
as strikebreakers, well before the large-scale migration of the World War I 
era (Dickerson 1986: 8; Commons 1904). But these strikebreakers were very 
small in number compared to the black migrants who would seek work in 
the North beginning in the mid-Teens. Many of the workers who moved
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north at the very beginning of the World War I era had some experience with 
industrial work in the South and had specific positions waiting for them in 
the North. The migrants who streamed north throughout the twenties and 
thirties, however, were primarily agricultural workers uprooted by the boll 
weevil and by poor growing seasons. According to Wright (1986: 205-6), 
they “generally had no assurances of jobs waiting in the North” but were 
taking “mere shots in the dark, made possible by the presence of friends 
and relatives in Northern cities.” For a number of black workers, these 
“shots in the dark” led to employment in the meat packing plants and steel 
mills of the North. By 1930, 13% of Illinois’ black manufacturing workers 
were found in meat packing plants; another 7% worked in the steel mills. 
Nearly 20% of Iowa’s black manufacturing workers labored in meat packing 
plants. In Pennsylvania, nearly 20% of black manufacturing workers were 
steelworkers. The share in steel in Indiana was even higher—nearly 25%.5
Most of these workers were initially confined to low-paying, unskilled 
laborer jobs in both industries (Fogel 1970; Gottlieb 1987). Were there 
notable differences in the progress of black workers in these industries? In 
particular, did the relative position of black workers—as reflected in rela­
tive wages and relative occupational standing—improve more rapidly in the 
meat packing industry or in the steel industry? Or were the rates of progress 
in the two industries about the same?
Table 1 presents the relative wages of black male workers in meat packing 
and steel, in the northern United States, in 1940. Wages for a number of other 
industries are presented for purposes of comparison.6 Note that the black 
workers considered here—blue-collar workers in northern industries—were 
doing better on average than the total black work force.7 Note also that I am 
focusing on a particular measure of black progress: the black/white wage 
ratio within an industry. It appears that black meat packing workers received 
slightly lower wages than did black steelworkers, in absolute terms. This re­
flects the generally higher wages in the steel industry. We are interested, how­
ever, in the black/white wage ratios in the two industries: black meat packing 
workers earned about 91% of what white meat packing workers earned, while 
black steelworkers earned only about 82% of white steelworkers’ earnings.
This difference in wage ratios is reflected in the occupational distribu­
tion of black and white workers in these two industries (see Table 2). In 
1940, about half of black meat packing workers held semiskilled operative
34 Social Science History
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Wage N Wage Ratio
Meat packing 23.76 79 26.00 788 .91
Steel 25.11 166 30.71 3382 .82
Autos 27.22 178 33.10 3640 .82
Chemicals 23.92 32 27.84 976 .86
Construction 19.52 249 28.04 6692 .70
Electrical machinery 22.73 10 28.79 1607 .79
Paper products 20.88 26 24.82 1423 .84
Railroads 21.41 238 32.17 4355 .66
Street transportation 21.50 40 31.55 1186 .68
Textiles 15.35 24 28.61 1386 .54
Trucking 17.96 38 24.84 1308 .72
Water transportation 19.57 42 27.41 460 .71
Source: 1940 Census Public Use Sample.
Notes: Set includes male, currently employed, wage and salary workers in skilled, operative, and laborer 
occupations. Individuals currently enrolled in school, under age 14, with weekly wages less than $1.50 or 
greater than $125.00, or with negative potential labor market experience (defined as age—schooling—6), 
are also omitted.
jobs. The share of black steelworkers in operative jobs was only about 23%, 
while two-thirds of black steelworkers held unskilled laborer positions.8 Of 
course, the two industries differed in overall occupational structure. We can 
control for this difference by examining the likelihood that a black worker 
held a particular job, relative to the likelihood that a white worker held the 
same job. For example, consider the ratio of the share of black meat packing 
workers in laborer jobs to the share of white meat packing workers in these 
jobs. Focusing on this ratio, we find that black meat packing workers were 
1.5 times as likely as white meat packing workers to hold laborer positions. 
In contrast, black steelworkers were twice as likely as their white counter­
parts to hold laborer positions. While black workers were .9 times as likely 
as whites to hold operative jobs in meat packing, they were only about two- 
thirds as likely as whites to hold such jobs in the steel industry.9
OLS wage regressions and ordered logit regressions for occupational 
position can be used to get a sense of the statistical significance of these 
differences, controlling for individual characteristics. Means for the wage re-
Table 2 Occupational distribution of black and white male workers in 
selected northern industries, 1940
Black White Ratio Black White Ratio
Meat packing Steel
Laborer .482 .317 1.52 .667 .332 2.01
Operative .506 .559 .905 .226 .335 .675
Skilled .012 .125 .096 .107 .334 .320
N 81 802 168 3431
Construction Railroads
Laborer .708 .304 2.33 .873 .284 3.07
Operative .075 .099 .758 .082 .293 .280
Skilled .217 .597 .363 .045 .423 .106
N 267 6969 244 4423
Trucking Water transportation
Laborer .500 .154 3.25 .767 .487 1.57
Operative .500 .801 .624 .209 .397 .526
Skilled 0 .045 0 .023 .116 .198
N 44 1368 43 476
Autos Paper products
Laborer .525 .129 4.07 .462 .245 1.89
Operative .332 .523 .635 .423 .546 .775
Skilled .144 .349 .413 .115 .210 .548
N 181 3703 26 1448
Chemicals Street transportation
Laborer .546 .322 1.70 .850 .087 9.77
Operative .394 .434 .908 .125 .733 .171
Skilled .061 .244 .250 .025 .181 .138
N 33 996 40 1202
Electrical machinery Textiles
Laborer .600 .147 4.08 .208 .045 4.62
Operative .300 .484 .620 .667 .728 .916
Skilled .100 .369 .271 .125 .226 .553
N 10 1656 24 1432
Source: 1940 Census Public Use Sample.
Notes: Set includes male, currently employed, wage and salary workers. Individuals currently enrolled in 
school, under age 14, or with negative potential labor market experience (defined as age—schooling—6), 
are also omitted.
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Table 3 Means for regression data set
Meat packing Steel
Black White Black White
Labor market experience 29.23 22.68 27.56 25.29
Married .84 .77 .86 .77
Immigrant 0 .23 .01 .28
Years o f schooling 7.01 8.20 6.28 7.93
Weekly wage 23.76 26.00 25.11 30.71
Log (weekly wage) 3.11 3.18 3.16 3.35
N 79 788 166 3382
Source: 1940 Census Public Use Sample.
Notes: Set includes male, currently employed, wage and salary workers in the laborer, operative, and 
skilled occupations in these industries in the North. Labor market experience defined as age—schooling— 
6. Individuals under the age of 14 or currently enrolled in school are excluded, as are those with weekly 
wages less than $1.50 or more than $125.00 and those with negative calculated labor market experience.
gression are found in Table 3. Results are in Table 4.10 In addition to standard 
individual-level variables, I include an industry dummy (“meat packing”) to 
capture the fact that the meat packing industry was generally a low-wage 
industry (relative to the steel industry). I also include a race-industry inter­
action term (“black*meat packing”). The positive coefficient on this term 
indicates that black men’s relative wages were, indeed, greater in meat pack­
ing than in steel even after we control for individual-level variables. Further, 
the magnitude of this coefficient indicates that very little of the difference in 
black relative wages across industries is explained by the characteristics of 
the black and white workers in the two industries. Without any controls, the 
difference between the average black and white log wages in steel exceeded 
this difference in meat packing by .114.11 After we control for the character­
istics of the workers, .098 of this initial .114 difference remains.12
Results of the ordered logit estimation of the determinants of occu­
pational position in these two industries are found in Table 5.13 Here, the 
industry dummy (“meat packing”) controls for the differing occupational 
structures of the two industries. The coefficient on the interaction of race 
and industry (“black*meat packing”) indicates the magnitude and signifi­
cance of the observed difference in the relative position of black workers. 
The fact that this coefficient is large and statistically significant means that 
this difference does persist after we control for individual characteristics.14
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Table 4 Weekly wage regression
Coefficient Standard error
Intercept 2.7741a .0460




Years o f school




More than 12 .1384a .0375
Black .1038 .1807
* Experience -.0129 .0100
* Experience2 .0002 .0002
* Married -.0186 .0746





*More than 12 .0703 .2454
Meat packing —. 1466a .0155
Black *meat packing .0984 b .0551
N  4415
R2 .1227
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the weekly wage. “Labor market experience” defined as age — 
schooling—6. Coefficients on schooling = “0 to 7” and “9 to 11” are returns per year in the interval. Other 
schooling coefficients refer to dummy variables for 8 or more, 12 or more, and more than 12 years of school. 
Controls for weeks worked are also included. 
a => | t |  > 1.96. 
b => 111 >1.64.
‘ Indicates interaction terms.
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Table 5 Ordered logit estimation of occupation
Coefficient Standard error
Intercept 1 —2.1767a .1941
Intercept 2 -3.9098a .2006
Labor market experience .1168a .0100








More than 12 .4032a .1883
Black 1.8127b .9831
* Experience -.1289a .0544
* Experience2 .0013 .0009
* Married .3441 .4375





*More than 12 -.3456 1.3739
Meat packing -.4051a .0745
Black*meat packing .9632a .2906
N  4482
-2  (log likelihood) 9253 
X 2 534.92
Notes: The dependent variable is a three-category dummy for skilled, operative, or laborer occupation. 
“Labor market experience” defined as age—schooling—6. Coefficients on schooling = “0 to 7” and “9 to 
11” are effects per year in the interval. Other schooling coefficients refer to dummy variables for 8 or more, 
12 or more, and more than 12 years of school. 
a => 111 >1.96. 
b => 111 >1.64.
* Indicates interaction terms.
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Table 6 Effect of race on occupational attainment, based on ordered logit 
estimation
Meat packing Steel
Probability (laborer | white) .314 .234
Probability (laborer | black) .537 .670
(Black probability)/(white probability) 1.710 2.863
Probability (operative | white) .407 .400
Probability (operative | black) .331 .250
(Black probability)/(white probability) .812 .626
Probability (skilled | white) .278 .367
Probability (skilled | black) .132 .080
(Black probability)/(white probability) .475 .219
Note: Probabilities calculated for black and white married, non-immigrant workers with mean schooling 
(7.9 years) and mean experience (24.9 years).
To evaluate the meaning of these logit results, we must construct esti­
mated occupational probabilities from the coefficients. Table 6 presents 
these probabilities, evaluated at roughly the mean characteristics for the full 
sample. In the meat packing industry, the total effect of being black (includ­
ing the direct effect and all interaction effects) is an increase of 22 points in 
one’s probability of holding an unskilled laborer job. In the steel industry, 
the effect is an increase of about 44 points. All other things equal, a black 
meat packing worker with mean characteristics was about 1.7 times as likely 
as an otherwise identical white worker to hold a laborer job. A black steel­
worker was almost 3 times as likely as a white steelworker to hold such a job. 
Similarly, while a black meat packing worker was about .81 times as likely as 
a white to hold a semiskilled operative job, a black steelworker was only .63 
times as likely as a white steelworker to hold such a position.
By 1940, then, black workers in the meat packing industry were on 
a more equal footing with their white counterparts than were black steel­
workers. Still, we are interested in having some measure of the pace of 
progress of black workers in these industries before World War II, rather 
than just a measure of the level they had reached by 1940. Data on the pre- 
1940 period are considerably thinner. Nonetheless, there are some measures 
that we can examine.
First, we can make use of the 1910 Public Use Microdata Sample.
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Table 7a Ordered logit estimation of occupation: pooled 1910 and 1940 data
Coefficient Standard error
Intercept 1 —2.2519a .2469
Intercept 2 -3.8900a .2504
Age . 1200a .0135
Age 2 —.0013a .0002
Married .3024a .0643
Immigrant -  7830a .0600
Black .5268 1.5774
* Age -.0707 .0836
* Age2 .0003 .0010
* Married .2698 .3977
Meat packing .4499a .1413
Black*meat packing -2.0756b 1.1127
1940 .4859a .0707
Black*1940 -.2912 .4624
Meat packing* 1940 -  8330a .1594
Black*meat packing* 1940 3.0319a 1.1493
N  5869
-2  (log likelihood) 12113 
X2 619.50
Notes: Set includes male, currently employed, wage and salary workers in laborer, operative, and skilled 
occupations in these industries in the North. Those younger than 14 and those currently enrolled in school 
are excluded. (The 1940 data are identical to those used in the 1940 occupation regression). The dependent 
variable is a three-category dummy for skilled, operative, or laborer occupation. 
a => |t |  >1.96.
| t | >1.64.
* Indicates interaction terms.
Though this data set does not contain information on wages or schooling, it 
does record occupation.15 We can use these data to estimate a logit equation 
for occupational position, pooling the 1910 and 1940 data and testing for dif­
ferences in rates of progress (see Tables 7a and 7b). The interaction of race, 
industry, and cross-section (“black*meat packing* 1940”) captures the dif­
ference between black progress in meat packing and black progress in steel. 
The size and significance of this term are our primary concern. The fact 
that this term has a positive and significant coefficient suggests that black 
workers did indeed make more rapid progress in meat packing than in steel,
Table 7b Occupational distribution of black and white male workers 
in the 1910 sample
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Meat packing Steel
Black White Black White
Laborer .923 .502 .679 .523
Operative 0 .126 .321 .324
Skilled .077 .372 0 .153
N 13 215 28 1131
in terms of occupational class, even after we control for individual charac­
teristics.16 However, the small size of the 1910 sample requires us to interpret 
these results with caution.17
The lack of public use samples for 1920 and 1930 leaves an unfortunate 
gap in the picture. We can fill in this gap a bit by turning to published Cen­
sus figures. Complete counts of occupation by industry, race, and region are 
not available in published tables for the 1910-40 period. However, counts of 
unskilled and semiskilled workers by industry and race are available for a 
few northern states for these years. Table 8 presents these numbers for the 
steel and meat packing industries.18 We must be careful what conclusions we 
draw from these data, as we can not observe the skilled sector in either in­
dustry. Changes in the racial composition of the skilled sector or in the size 
of the skilled sector relative to the other sectors might affect our interpreta­
tion of these numbers.
Even with these caveats, these numbers generally parallel the patterns 
observed in the public use samples. The initial wave of new black workers 
found themselves largely confined to unskilled labor: in 1920, the ratio of the 
share of black workers in laborer jobs to the share of white workers in these 
jobs was about 1.2 in both industries.19 Between 1920 and 1930, though, black 
meat packing workers improved their relative position: their relative con­
centration in laborer jobs fell while their relative concentration in operative 
jobs increased. The relative position of black steelworkers did not improve to 
the same degree. Between 1930 and 1940, the relative concentration of black 
workers in laborer positions increased slightly in both industries. However, 
black meat packing workers continued to occupy a better relative position, 
as was indicated in the occupation regressions reported above.
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Share o f 
whites Ratio
Share o f 
blacks
Share o f 
whites Ratio
1910
Laborer .927 .864 1.07 .843 .748 1.13
Operative .073 .136 .54 .157 .252 .62
1920
Laborer .764 .630 1.21 .885 .732 1.21
Operative .236 .370 .64 .115 .268 .43
1930
Laborer .663 .618 1.07 .854 .701 1.22
Operative .337 .382 .88 .146 .299 .49
1940
Laborer .404 .353 1.14 .722 .510 1.42
Operative .596 .647 .92 .278 .490 .57
Notes: Figures indicate (no. Laborers)/(no. Laborers + no. Operatives) and (no. Operatives)/(no. Laborers + 
no. Operatives) in each industry in the northern states for which the data are available. For 1910,1920, and 
1930, “stockyard laborers” are included in the laborer category (see Fogel [1970]: 125). In 1940, service 
workers are included in the laborer category. In all cases, only males are included.
Included states for meat packing are 1910: Illinois, New York, and Kansas; 1920: Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylva­
nia, and Wisconsin; 1930: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska; 1940: Only workers 
in the following cities are included: Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit, Kansas City (Missouri), St. Louis, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Newark, New York City, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus.
Included states for steel are 1910: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island; 1920: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Mas­
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; 
1930: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania; 1940: Only workers 
in the following cities are included: Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit, Kansas City (Missouri), St. Louis, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Newark, New York City, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus.
Sources: Thirtenth Census of the United States (1910), Population Volume 4, Table 7; Fourtenth Census of the United States (1920), Population Volume 4, Chapter 7, Table 1; Fiftenth Census of the United States (1930), Population Volume 4, Table 11; Sixtenth Census of the United States (1940), Population Volume 3, 
Parts 2 to 5, Table 20.
Of course, these numbers do not control for tenure. Higher growth rates 
in the steel industry during the years of black migration could lead to more 
recent black hires in steel than in meat packing, which might in turn depress 
the observed relative position of black steelworkers. This phenomenon could 
have some effect on the 1930 numbers, as employment growth in northern
steel outpaced growth in northern meat packing in the late 1920s. However, 
differences in employment growth cannot explain the 1940 patterns. While 
employment in both industries declined in the late 1930s, the decline was 
much more rapid in the steel industry.20
In sum, as black migrants came north and sought industrial work, they 
met with differing degrees of success in the meat packing and steel indus­
tries. By 1940, they had begun to move out of laborer jobs in the meat 
packing industry, and their earnings in this industry were quite close to the 
earnings of white workers. In steel, black workers made little progress out 
of laborer jobs, and their relative earnings were considerably lower than the 
relative earnings of black meat packing workers. Why should the rate of black 
progress vary across industries? Why was race a more inflexible barrier to 
advance for black steelworkers than for black meat packing workers?
Organized Labor and Black Advance in Meat 
Packing and Steel
One place to look for explanations of differences in racial inequality across 
industries is in the history of labor organizing in these industries. Did the 
dominant unions in meat packing successfully promote anti-discrimination 
policies while organized labor in the steel industry took a more exclusion- 
ist stance toward black workers? Did racially-inclusive industrial unionism 
establish itself earlier in meat packing than in steel?
Relations between organized labor and black workers in the steel indus­
try in the first half of this century followed a typical pattern for the time. The 
craft-based unions which dominated the labor movement through World 
War I tended to exclude unskilled workers in general and black workers spe­
cifically, and the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers 
of North America, the major union in the steel industry through World 
War I, was no exception (Elbaum and Wilkinson 1979: 288-98). One result 
of the union’s exclusionist stance was that black workers were used against 
the Amalgamated as strikebreakers, including during the Homestead strike 
of 1891-92 (Gottlieb 1987: 91-92,153)21
When the labor movement revived in the steel industry during World 
War I, black workers remained outside the movement. Only 12 black workers 
in all of Pittsburgh joined the 1919 strike, along with 8 of the 1737 black
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workers at Homestead, and none of “several hundred” at Duquesne and 
Braddock (ibid.: 156-59; Clayton and Mitchell 1971: 132-35). Again, black 
strikebreakers were used, though employers tended to exaggerate their num­
bers and moved them from place to place in order to convince the strikers 
that a bottomless well of cheap black labor was available (ibid., p. 136; Hogan 
1971, ch. 20). Most of the black workers used to break the strike were re­
placed once the conflict ended (Gottlieb 1987: 150-51).
There were several incidents of labor unrest in the industry in the 1920s, 
but none on any large scale. There was no broad-based organizing until 
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) formed in 1935. Their 
first major contract was signed in 1937 with the Carnegie-Illinois division 
of U.S. Steel. By the end of 1937, contracts covered 375,000 workers at 
142 companies (Hogan 1971:1170-84). Black and white workers participated 
in SWOC with about equal frequency (though not as frequently as immi­
grants). In addition to being open to black workers in terms of membership, 
the union supported the desegregation of facilities and equality in seniority 
and advancement. Moreover, black workers achieved a considerable num­
ber of leadership positions in the union (Dickerson 1986: 147; Clayton and 
Mitchell 1971: 138-53).
In the meat packing industry, as in the steel industry, black workers were 
excluded from the craft-based organizing that dominated labor activity be­
fore World War I and were repeatedly used to break strikes (Fogel 1970, ch. 
3; Perry and Kegley 1989; Commons 1904). Even during the World War I 
period, when the Stockyards Labor Council attempted to create a more in­
clusive labor movement in meat packing, black workers remained outside the 
movement (Barrett 1987: 208-14; Cohen 1990: 3-4). They were again used 
to break strikes in East St. Louis in 1916 and in Chicago in 1921-22 (Fogel 
1970, ch. 3).
After the 1921 strike, unions were not a significant force in the meat 
packing industry until the late thirties. By that time, the Packinghouse 
Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC), founded in 1937, had learned 
that the union could not succeed without the support of black workers. In 
addition, black workers were now more ready to participate in the union, 
perhaps due to a sense that the gains from strikebreaking had been short­
lived. “Whatever their motivation, black workers made a dramatic shift from 
the apathy and, worse, opposition, to the unionization of steel and packing
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they had exhibited in 1919 and now looked to a multiracial union movement 
for their economic survival” (Cohen 1990: 336). PWOC (which became the 
United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) in 1943) emerged as 
the dominant union in the industry by establishing master agreements with 
Armour, Swift, Wilson, and Cudahy in the early forties (Perry and Kegley 
1989: 102-9).
In both industries, then, blacks remained outside of the labor move­
ment through the World War I period. Though organizers in meat packing 
made greater efforts to include blacks than were made in the steel industry, 
these efforts were largely unsuccessful. From early 1922 through the mid- 
1930s, there was no widespread organizing in either industry. When success­
ful unions with effective policies of non-discrimination emerged in the late 
thirties, the timing of their emergence suggests that they were not respon­
sible for the differing rates of black progress in the two industries: While 
SWOC had organized a large number of plants by 1937, PWOC achieved its 
major victories in the early forties. It appears that we must look elsewhere 
for the roots of the rapid advance of black workers in the meat packing in­
dustry relative to the steel industry.22
Labor Market Structure and Differing Rates of 
Advance for Black Workers
The relationship between labor market structure and the cost of experiment­
ing with black workers may provide an answer to the puzzle posed by differ­
ences in black progress in these two industries. The basic insight here draws 
on models developed by Spence (1974: chapters 4 and 5), Thurow (1975: 
chapter 7), and McCall (1972): employers learn about black workers’ abili­
ties by observing the performance of the workers they have hired. If racial 
prejudice and high costs of experimentation cause employers to exclude 
black workers from certain jobs, they will gain no new information about the 
ability of black workers to perform these jobs. They will therefore continue 
to practice exclusion. The lower an employer’s costs of experimentation, the 
more likely he is to try black workers in new positions. The performance of 
these workers may then cause the employer to revise his expectations about 
black workers and may make him more willing to hire them in the future.
Here I will consider elements of internal labor market structure which
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might affect the cost of experimenting with black workers. I then examine 
the ways in which these elements were present (or not present) in the steel 
and meat packing labor markets. My purpose is not so much to establish why 
these labor markets differed but how they differed and how the differences 
might have affected the use of black workers.
Job Ladders, Internal Promotion, 
and Pre-Hire Screening
The use of job ladders and internal promotion increases the importance of 
the pre-hire screening of workers. When job ladders are used, the hiring de­
cision must take into account the skill requirements of jobs all along the 
ladder, not merely the entry job (Doeringer and Piore 1971:103-4). Because 
employers need an adequate supply of workers to jobs all along the job lad­
der, they cannot afford to hire entry-level workers who are not suited for 
promoted positions. This need to consider the requirements of promoted 
positions at the time of hire increases the potential cost of experimenting 
with black workers in entry-level positions. An employer in a firm which re­
lies heavily on internal promotion may believe that black workers are capable 
of performing entry-level work but that they cannot adequately perform the 
work of promoted positions. The employer will be unwilling to bring these 
workers into entry jobs, which he believes they can perform, because he fears 
that he will find himself with an inadequate supply of workers for promoted 
positions along the job ladder. If jobs were not tied together in ladders, and 
if the employer could tap the external market to fill positions along the job 
ladder, he might be willing to hire black workers into entry positions. He 
might then find black workers to be more able than expected and may ulti­
mately move some of them into higher-level jobs.
This constraint on the use of black workers will be less binding the more 
“pyramidal” the job structure. If there are many more entry positions than 
promoted positions, an employer may bring a small number of black workers 
into the entry port of a job ladder with no intention of promoting them and 
still have an adequate number of white workers to staff upper-level positions. 
On the other hand, if, as part of the nature of the job, all workers in the 
entry position receive on-the-job training, the employer might expect that 
using black workers in these jobs will involve a waste of training resources
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on unpromotable workers. Finally, employers would expect that any effort- 
inducing effect of promotion lines would be ineffective for black workers (as 
long as black workers know that they are considered unpromotable). This 
expectation would further reduce the employer’s willingness to hire black 
workers into formal job ladders.
What do we know about the use of internal promotion and pre-hire 
screening in the meat packing and steel industries? Arthur Carver (1928: 
41), a member of the industrial relations department at Swift, portrayed 
the meat packing labor market as marked by very informal hiring practices. 
While firms in other industries developed lists of detailed job specifications 
“which determine very accurately the qualifications which applicants should 
possess . . . few such formal studies have been made [in the meat packing 
industry].” Even skilled workers were taken in informally (ibid.: 43): “Some 
industries have made extensive use of trade tests in selecting skilled labor; 
but, with comparatively few exceptions, the packing house industry has 
not yet done so.” Instead of administering screening tests, employers hired 
workers on a probationary basis, making continued employment conditional 
on demonstrated ability (ibid.: 43-44). The employers thus did not have to 
pre-judge workers based on easily observed characteristics, but rather could 
experiment with workers, observe performance, and allocate labor accord­
ingly. We would expect such informal hiring policies to be correlated with an 
absence of formal job ladders and internal lines of promotion. In fact, Herbst 
found that promotion schemes were not widely used in the 24 Chicago meat 
packing firms that she studied (Herbst 1932: 69-70).
The situation in the steel industry was quite different. Established lines 
of internal promotion were being used in steel plants even before World 
War I. As early as 1908, journalist John Fitch noted the use of “rigid lines 
of promotion” throughout the steel mill he studied (Stone 1974: 115). Like­
wise, in describing the steel industry in the years leading to World War I, 
William Hogan (1971: 451) says, “Modern production established a definite 
line of promotion under which each worker trained for the next highest posi­
tion.” The tight markets and labor unrest of the World War I period simply 
increased the use of internal promotion, as employers believed this would 
make the work force more stable (Lazonick 1983:127).
The use of job ladders in the steel industry increased the potential cost 
of experimenting with black workers. Black workers could still get hired as
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Sources: Monthly Labor Review 32: 358-64 (for 1929 and 1930), 51: 696-708 (for 1931) and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Bulletin no. 694: 529-33 (for 1932-1940).
Note: Rates reflect turnover among production workers only.
Figure 1 Annual dismissal rates: meat packing, steel, 
and manufacturing average
casual laborers in steel, since employers “made no commitments to promote 
or train those in casual labor, preferring to keep them on the payroll only as 
long as work needed to be done” (Gottlieb 1987: 110).
Indirect evidence concerning the use of pre-hire screening can be found 
in dismissal rates (see Figure 1; note that these figures reflect the dismissal 
of workers with prejudice, rather than simple layoffs).23 Dismissal rates in 
meat packing tended to be nearly double the manufacturing average through 
1935, while the rates in iron and steel tended to be considerably lower than 
the manufacturing average. Additional evidence on the use of dismissal is 
found in Emil Frankel’s (1919) study of 18 Chicago-area firms, two of which 
were meat packing firms. The two meat packing firms made considerably 
greater use of dismissal than did the 16 other establishments. Of the 20,000 
dismissals recorded for the 18 firms between June 1917 and June 1918,15,000 
took place in the two meat packing firms. In addition, these two firms had 
more of their turnover accounted for by dismissal than any of the other 
firms24 This difference in the use of dismissal suggests that meat packing 
employers screened applicants less rigorously before hire (as Carver de­
scribes), preferring instead to hire workers, observe them, and then dismiss 
them if need be. Employers in the steel industry used dismissal more spar­
ingly, reflecting their need to screen workers more strictly at hire in order to 
coordinate flows of workers along the job ladder.
Turnover, Custom, and Co-Worker Prejudice
As job ladders and bureaucratized labor policies take root at a firm, turn­
over declines and a stable internal work force arises. This stable work force 
will develop set expectations about how work is to be conducted at the firm. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971: 22-23) refer to this process as the development 
of custom. The development of custom regarding the role of black workers 
is likely to prevent their access to new positions. Stated another way, the im­
portance of co-worker prejudice is likely to be greater in workplaces with 
stable internal work forces. Donald Dewey discussed the effect of a stable 
internal work force on the use of black workers. He suggested that “will­
ingness to work with Negroes varies inversely with group solidarity, which 
in turn depends in large measure upon the rate of turnover” (Dewey 1952: 
285). In “The Technique of Introducing Negroes Into the Plant,” Herman 
Feldman advised that high-turnover departments should be used as the ini­
tial point of entry for black workers into a plant because “contacts between 
workers are somewhat casual” in these departments and racial tension was 
therefore less likely to pose a problem (Feldman 1942: 463). Experimenta­
tion with black workers carried a price in the form of resistance from white 
workers, and this price increased with the stability of the internal work force.
What evidence do we have concerning turnover in these two industries? 
Figure 2 presents the net turnover rate for the meat packing and steel in­
dustries, along with the manufacturing average, for 1929-40.25 The turnover 
rate for the meat packing industry clearly exceeded the rate for manufac­
turing as a whole in the pre-World War II era. Turnover in iron and steel 
tended to be considerably lower throughout the period. Following Dewey’s 
argument, these low turnover rates in the steel industry may have increased 
the opposition of incumbent workers to the introduction of black workers.
It would of course be helpful to know what turnover rates looked like 
in these industries before the onset of the Great Depression. Brissenden 
and Frankel (1920) provide some additional evidence on turnover rates in 
the meat packing industry prior to 1930. They present net turnover rates 
for 1913-14 for meat packing, autos and auto parts, chemical refineries, tex­
tiles, furniture, leather and rubber goods, machinery manufacturing, mis­
cellaneous metal products, printing and publishing, and public utilities. The 
net turnover rate in the meat packing industry was 8.0 employees per 10,000
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Sources: Monthly Labor Review 32: 358-64 (for 1929 and 1930), 51: 696-708 (for 1931) and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Bulletin no. 694: 529-33 (for 1932-40).
Note: Rates reflect turnover among production workers only.
Figure 2 Annual net turnover rates: meat packing, steel, 
and manufacturing average
labor hours in 1913-14. The next highest net rate was 5.2 in the auto indus­
try. The average over the included industries was 3.1.26
The marked differences in turnover rates in these two industries may be 
partly due to technology. The meat packing industry faced great fluctuations 
in labor demand, with peak demand in the months from November to Janu­
ary (Herbst 1932: 70). Under these conditions, it may not have been profit­
able for firms to attempt to reduce turnover, as that would require retaining 
redundant workers in slack periods. The incentives regarding turnover in the 
steel industry were quite different. Here, employers were greatly concerned 
with attaching workers to the firm. Indeed, the development of job ladders 
cited above may have arisen to promote such attachments. Technological 
changes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially the development 
of the open hearth process, and later the mechanization of rolling, greatly in­
creased the pace of steel production. The volume and pace of the flow of ma­
terial through the plant, along with the increasing integration of the produc­
tion process, meant that coordination between workers was essential. There 
was therefore a payoff to maintaining a stable, experienced internal labor 
force (Lazonick 1983: 117; Nuwer 1988: 837; Graziosi 1981: 537). Whatever 
the underlying causes, the differences in turnover were quite pronounced.
It appears, then, that the characteristics of the labor markets in these 
industries promoted lower costs of experimentation with black workers in
the meat packing industry. So what did meat packers learn from these ex­
periments? The employers in the plant studied by Herbst in the mid-1920s 
learned that, among workers eligible for production bonuses, black men 
earned their bonuses more often than whites (Herbst 1932:119). In addition, 
they learned that black male quit rates were lower than white male quit rates 
(ibid.: 139). To gain this knowledge, employers in the meat packing indus­
try had to be willing to make the experiment. They were willing because the 
structure of their labor market kept the cost of the experiment low.27
If we look to the fortunes of black workers in other northern indus­
tries at this time, do we find any evidence which might corroborate the “cost 
of experimentation” idea? A complete answer to this question would, of 
course, require several more case studies examining the personnel practices 
of a variety of industries. We can, however, glean a little more information 
from the Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics data gathered here. Unfor­
tunately, BLS turnover series are reported for only two more industries for 
which we also have a reasonable number of observations in the 1940 public- 
use sample: autos and electrical machinery. The auto industry was charac­
terized by very high net turnover and dismissal rates, nearly as high as those 
in the meat packing industry. Turnover rates were much lower in the elec­
trical machinery industry—below the manufacturing average, but slightly 
higher than in the steel industry28
To see how black workers fared in these additional industries, I re­
estimated the wage and occupation equations with workers from all four 
industries included. Controlling for individual characteristics, the black rela­
tive occupational position was significantly higher in the meat packing indus­
try than in any of the three other industries. Black relative wages were also 
greatest in meat packing, but only the meat packing-steel difference was sta­
tistically significant at the 5% level (though both the meat packing-auto and 
meat packing-electrical machinery differences were significant at the 10% 
level). Black workers fared better in autos than in electrical machinery or 
steel, both in terms of relative wages and relative occupational status. These 
differences were, however, small and not statistically significant. Finally, 
black steelworkers enjoyed slightly higher relative wages and occupational 
status than did black electrical machinery workers, but these differences were 
also small and insignificant.29 While the rank-ordering of these coefficients is 
about as we would expect based on turnover in these industries, the lack of
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statistical significance and the small difference between black relative wages 
in the auto industry and black relative wages in the steel industry raise some 
concerns about the generalizability of the model presented here. We might 
question, however, whether these turnover series, considered alone, are suf­
ficiently descriptive of internal labor market conditions in these industries. 
Evidence presented in Baron, Jennings, and Dobbin (1988) suggests that the 
internal labor market of the auto industry was marked by the presence of job 
ladders and formal personnel practices by 1935. Why these formal practices 
coincided with high turnover rates and how these combined forces affected 
the use of black workers in this industry remain questions for further study.
Conclusion
Just as the progress of black workers appears to have been uneven over time 
(Donohue and Heckman 1991), their progress was also uneven across indus­
tries; in particular, black male workers made more rapid progress in the meat 
packing industry than in the steel industry in the pre-World War II North. 
This “progress” is defined purely on the basis of relative wages and occu­
pational position within the industry. Nor is this to suggest that there were 
no stringent racial barriers to be faced in meat packing. Black meat packing 
workers certainly had less access than white workers to more prestigious, 
more pleasant, and more public jobs, such as those in the mechanical de­
partment, the smokehouse, and the packing department (Herbst 1932: 112).
Nonetheless, black workers in the meat packing industry gained more 
ground on their white co-workers before 1940 than did black workers in 
the steel industry. Differences in workers’ individual characteristics cannot 
account for the differing rates of progress of black steel and meat pack­
ing workers. Nor could union activity have produced these industry-specific 
race effects. Unions in the two industries were simply too weak from the 
early 1920s through the late 1930s to greatly affect racial policy.
Rather, the evidence presented here indicates that the effect of internal 
labor markets on experimentation with black workers may explain these dif­
fering rates of progress. In the years following World War I, many northern 
industrial employers had to make decisions about black workers for the first 
time. In this environment, part of what was essential to the advance of black 
manufacturing workers was simply getting the opportunity to display their
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abilities. A worker had to somehow get the chance to show what he could 
do. In the meat packing industry, these opportunities came because the em­
ployer risked very little in the experiment, and, as a result, black workers 
were able to improve their relative position in this industry. In the steel 
industry, the experiment was more costly, the opportunities came less fre­
quently, and progress was made more slowly.
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1 Statistical discrimination models revolve around costly information, while criti­
cisms o f these models emphasize the employer’s ability to learn from observing 
workers’ performance. See Arrow (1973); Phelps (1972); Aigner and Cain (1977); 
McCall (1972).
2 Whatley (1990) is an exception, however.
3 17,479 women were employed in blue-collar jobs in the northern meat products in­
dustry in 1940, and 5,568 women were employed in blue-collar jobs in northern blast 
furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills (United States Department o f Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census o f the United States (1940), Population 
Volume 3, Part 1, Table 82). In the 1/100 PUM S sample, applying the sample re­
strictions described below, we find only 48 white women and no black women in the 
steel industry, and 150 white women and 2 black women in meat packing. Obviously, 
these samples will not support an investigation of racial inequality among women in 
these industries.
4 For an analysis o f the effect on black women of changes in the market for domes­
tic help in the pre-World War II  period, see Neckerman (1993). For an examination 
o f the importance o f experimentation and demand-side learning in determining 
labor market outcomes for women during and after World War II, see Kiefer and 
Philips (1993).
5 United States Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, Fifteenth Census 
o f the United States (1930), Population Volume 4, Table 11. Only male semiskilled 
operatives and unskilled laborers are included.
6 These data come from the 1940 Census Public Use Microdata Sample (the full 1 /100
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sample is used). The set includes male, currently employed wage and salary workers 
in the North. Only production workers (skilled workers and foremen, operatives, 
and laborers) are included. Those on government emergency work in 1940 are ex­
cluded. Service workers are included in the “ laborer” category. “ North” refers to 
the Northeast and North Central Census regions. These two regions include 21 
states: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Ver­
mont, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wis­
consin, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South 
Dakota. Weekly wages are based on annual earnings and weeks worked reported for 
the previous year (1939). I throw out those under the age o f 14, those who are cur­
rently enrolled in school, and those with negative calculated labor market experience 
(age—schooling—6). For the wage analysis, I also throw out those with calculated 
weekly wages under $1.50 or over $125.00; these are the cutoffs used by Smith and 
Welch (1989). All wages are in nominal terms.
The overall black/white wage ratio for blue-collar workers in these industries in the 
North is .76. I f  we include nonblue-collar workers in these industries, the ratio falls 
to .71. Smith and Welch, using restrictions on weeks worked and school enrollment, 
but not on industry, occupation, or region, find a black/white wage ratio o f .43 in 
1940 (1989: 522).
Black steelworkers do seem to be surprisingly well represented at the skilled level 
given the relatively low black/white wage ratio in steel. Note, though, that the 
black/white wage ratio among skilled steelworkers was only .70. In fact, black 
operatives in steel had a slightly higher mean wage ($25.00) than did black skilled 
steelworkers ($24.27). Thus the presence o f black workers in these occupations may 
not indicate as much progress as appears at first glance.
These distributions include only currently employed workers. They may therefore 
reflect differences in unemployment rates across industries at the end o f the De­
pression, rather than true differences in the progress o f black workers. It seems 
likely that the Depression had a greater impact on workers in heavy industries like 
steel than those in meat packing. I f  black workers, especially black workers in semi­
skilled positions, bore the brunt o f Depression-era layoffs, these 1940 distributions 
might understate the movement o f black workers into semiskilled jobs in steel over 
the pre-1940 period. To address this issue, I recalculated the 1940 occupational dis­
tributions for these two industries with unemployed workers included; that is, in 
addition to currently-employed workers, I included those with a job but not cur­
rently at work, unemployed experienced workers, and unemployed new workers. 
However, including these workers in the skill distributions does not alter the evi­
dence that black meat packing workers enjoyed better relative occupational status 
than did black steelworkers. Still, even these calculations do not take into account 
unemployed meat packing or steelworkers who took Public Emergency Work (PEW ) 
positions. These workers were instructed to report their PEW job as their cur­
rent occupation (though not all did so). Black workers were more likely than white
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workers to be on Public Emergency Work (Margo 1991). However, this racial dif­
ference in PEW participation would matter here only if, for example, unemployed 
black steel operatives were more likely to be PEW workers than were unemployed 
black meat packing operatives. I know o f no evidence o f such a particular race, occu­
pation, and industry selection into PEW jobs.
In both the OLS wage regression and the logit occupation estimation, I allow 
for graduation effects (separate coefficients for finishing the 8th and 12th years o f 
schooling). I also allow for differing annual effects o f schooling in years 0-7 and 9­
11, and I include a dummy for those with more than 12 years o f school. Equations 
with linear and quadratic effects o f schooling were also estimated. Changing the way 
schooling enters into the estimation had very little effect on the other coefficients. 
Average (in white wage)—average (in black wage) = .188 in steel, .074 in meat pack­
ing. .188 -  .074 = .114.
As an illustration, consider a married, non-immigrant black worker with 15 years of 
experience and 8 years o f schooling. I f  this worker is in the steel industry, race affects 
his earnings through the coefficients on black, black*married, black*experience and 
its square, and black*schooling. The sum of these effects is -.177. Race affects a 
black meat packing worker’s wages through all o f the above coefficients, plus the co­
efficient on the black*meat packing term. So the net effect o f race for a black meat 
packing worker with the given characteristics is -.177 + .098 = .079. The differ­
ence between the net effect o f race on log wages for a black meat packing worker 
and a black steelworker equals .098, which is the coefficient on black*meat packing. 
Note that this does not mean that a black meat packing worker earned more than a 
comparable black steelworker in absolute terms.
In addition, note that this specification o f the wage equation does not allow 
for differences in returns to education across industries. Education may have been 
more necessary for access to better jobs and better pay in the steel industry than 
in the meat packing industry — if this were the case, then these equations are mis- 
specified. What we have interpreted as industry-specific effects o f race on wages 
might really be industry-specific returns to education, combined with lower educa­
tional levels among black workers. To test this possibility, I re-estimated the wage 
equation, allowing returns to education to differ between the two industries by add­
ing meat packing*education interaction terms. Addition o f these interactions to the 
wage equation reduces the coefficient o f the black*meat packing term only slightly, 
from .098 to .092 (t = 1.65).
The data are the same as those used in the wage equations, without the applica­
tion o f the high- and low-wage cutoffs. The means are essentially identical to those 
found in Table 3.
Again, it may be important to allow the effect of schooling to differ by industry— 
access to non-laborer positions in the steel industry may have required greater edu­
cation than such access in the meat packing industry. As in the wage equation, how­
ever, allowing the impact o f education to vary by industry reduces the race*industry
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coefficient only slightly (from .963 to .903) and does not affect its statistical signifi­
cance.
15 The selection criteria are the same for 1910 as for 1940: currently employed, male, 
wage and salary workers in these industries in the North, in blue-collar occupations 
(skilled workers and foremen, operatives, and laborers). Schooling is not recorded 
in 1910, so labor market experience cannot be calculated; age and age2 are included 
in the estimation instead. The 1910 sample is a 1/250 sample. It includes occupa­
tion codes based on the coding scheme used for the 1980 Public Use Sample. This 
scheme is very similar to the one used in the 1940 sample, at least at the 1-digit 
level. The occupational classifications used here should therefore be consistent for 
the two cross-sections.
16 We can calculate estimated occupational probabilities based on this pooled regres­
sion, evaluating the coefficients for married, non-immigrant workers o f mean age. 
These calculations indicate that, in 1910, a black meat packing worker was about 4 
times as likely as an otherwise identical white meat packing worker to hold a laborer 
job. By 1940, a black meat packing worker was 1.6 times as likely as a white to hold 
a laborer job. In steel, a black worker was 2.1 times as likely as a white to hold a 
laborer job in 1910, and 2.8 times as likely in 1940. A black meat packing worker 
was .20 times as likely as a white to hold an operative job in 1910, and .90 times as 
likely in 1940. Comparable figures for black workers in the steel industry are .65 in 
1910 and .75 in 1940. Finally, a black meat packing worker was .05 times as likely as 
a white to hold a skilled position in 1910 and .56 times as likely in 1940. Comparable 
figures for black workers in the steel industry are .31 in 1910 and .27 in 1940.
17 We cannot control for education in this estimation because schooling is not recorded 
in 1910. A separate occupation regression for 1910 which includes literacy controls 
produces a negative and significant (t = 1.72) coefficient on the black*meat packing 
interaction. Again, this result indicates that the better relative position o f black meat 
packing workers in 1940 is the product o f more rapid progress in the 1910-40 period.
18 Data from all available northern states are used, but this set changes in each cross­
section.
19 Because skilled workers are not included in these calculations, these ratios are not 
comparable to those presented in Table 2 and Table 6.
20 Between 1927 and 1929, the average annual employment growth rate in the north­
ern steel industry was 4%, compared to about 1% in the meat packing industry 
Between 1937 and 1939, northern steel industry employment declined at a 9% an­
nual rate, while meat packing employment declined at a rate o f 2.5% per year. These 
numbers for the steel industry reflect production worker employment in Pennsyl­
vania, New York, Ohio, and Illinois. These four states accounted for roughly 75% 
o f all production workers in the steel industry in the United States. Numbers for 
the meat packing industry refer to production workers in Pennsylvania, New York, 
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. These states ac-
Degrees of Inequality 57
counted for 75-80% of all production workers in the meat packing industry—see 
United States Department o f Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census 
o f the United States-Manufactures 1929, Volume 2: Reports by Industries (Wash­
ington, 1933), Biennial Census o f Manufacturing 1937 (Part 1) (Washington, 1939), 
and Sixteenth Census o f the United States-Manufactures 1939, Volume 2 Part 1: 
Reports by Industries (Groups 1-10) (Washington, 1942).
On the use of black strikebreakers more generally, see Whatley 1993.
One might argue that the hiring o f black workers to counteract unionism (outside 
o f the use o f black workers as strikebreakers) contributed to the more rapid advance 
o f black meat packing workers. Employers in meat packing certainly believed that 
black workers could not be brought into the union movement and so were useful 
in preventing unionization (Herbst 1932: xxii). But employers in the steel indus­
try believed this as well (Dickerson 1986: 17; Gottlieb 1987: 161-62; Greene and 
Woodson 1969: 253). Why should this strategy have led to greater rewards for black 
meat packing workers than for black steelworkers?
These rates refer to the United States as a whole. They are not available separately 
by region.
Unfortunately, turnover rates cannot be calculated from this data because employ­
ment is not reported. 25 firms are studied, but only 18 report turnover broken 
down by type. The other industries represented include “ mail order houses,” “ car 
works,” “ iron foundry,” “ printing presses, mfg.,” “ machinery (specialties), mfg.,” 
“ machinery (coal-mining), mfg.,” “ brass and metal specialties, mfg.,” “ agricultural 
implements, mfg.,” “ public utilities (telephone),” “ public utilities (electric),” “ elec­
trical supplies, mfg.,” and “ clay products, mfg.”
The net turnover rate is the minimum of the accession and separation rates. It pro­
vides a measure o f turnover purged of the effects o f growth or decline in the size o f 
an industry’s labor force. These turnover rates are for the United States as a whole; 
they are not available separately by region.
I have not found similar pre-1929 data on turnover in the steel industry.
In investigating whether such observations could alter attitudes toward black work­
ers, I have not found direct, systematic evidence on racial attitudes in the pre-World 
War II meat packing industry. However, a study o f the introduction of black workers 
into new departments within meat packing plants in the late 1940s found that the 
longer a department had been integrated, the less prejudicial were the responses o f 
white workers on surveys o f racial attitudes (Palmore 1954: chap. 5). O f course, self­
selection by white workers into particular departments could bias these responses. 
See Monthly Labor Review 32: 358-64 and 51: 696-708 and Bureau of Labor Statis­
tics Bulletin no. 694: 529-33 for these turnover series.
With steel as the omitted category, the estimated black*industry interaction terms 
were the following: in the wage equation, ySbhck.meM packing = .0901, /Sblack.autos =  .0203,
and t^>lack*electrical mach. -.1067; in the occupation regression, £bUck.meatpacking =
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1.0588, Pbhck.lMOS -  .1018, and /3bilck.deancai mach. =  -.4085. In the text, “ statistical 
significance” refers to a one-tailed test with a = .05.
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